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The Case of Income Tax Evasion in Jordan: Symptoms and Solutions 
 
Abstract 
Purpose- The purpose of this paper is to examine income tax evasion in Jordan and 
set forth various cures for this problem.     
Design/methodology/approach- The paper investigates the phenomenon of income 
tax evasion. In doing so, the paper reviews reports from academics and statistics from 
the Income Tax Department. The paper begins with an overview of the Income Tax 
Law. The paper then distinguishes between tax evasion and tax avoidance and 
provides empirical data on the size of income tax evasion in Jordan. A study of article 
42 of the Income Tax Law, the anti-tax evasion provision, is made. In the final 
analysis, the paper suggests several means that can be used to address income tax 
evasion. 
Findings- The paper concludes that, in so far as the Jordanian government is 
concerned with the issue of income tax evasion, several legal and non-legal 
techniques can be experimented.    
Originality/value- In reacting to huge non-compliance by Jordanians, the paper tells 
the story of how to create an income tax compliance culture. The government can 
utilize various practices, techniques, and discourses to create such a culture.  
Keywords: Income Tax Law, Jordan, Tax evasion 
Paper type: Research paper 
 
1. Introduction        
       The role of taxes in Jordan has developed dramatically to enable the government 
to implement its fiscal policy in order to become more independent (Margalioth, 
2003). The tax system in Jordan was expanded to achieve not only fiscal objectives 
but also economic and social objectives. Taxes in Jordan are fiscal instruments used 
by the government to spur the national economy, promote investment in sustainable 
projects, control consumption of commodities and services, and remedy income 
disparities among individuals (Avi-Yonah, 2006). The Jordanian government has 
given top priority to reform the tax system to achieve integration and 
comprehensiveness in direct and indirect taxes and achieve tax equality. 
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       Tax rules in Jordan come from different sources. The most important source is 
the Constitution which provides general principles that guide the government in 
enacting further tax laws. Other complementary laws include the Customs Law No. 
20 of 1998 and its amendments. There are also government decrees, regulations, and 
instructions that form a source of tax law in Jordan.  
       This article does not attempt to provide a full account of the history and details of 
the income tax system in Jordan. Its aim is far more modest. It seeks to provide an 
insight into the problem of tax evasion in Jordan. The current article aims at 
identifying the symptoms of tax evasion and suggests ways of tackling it. However, 
before proceeding, it is worthwhile briefing the tax system of Jordan to pin down the 
phenomenon of tax evasion, to understand its constituent parts, and to evaluate how it 
might be alleviated. 
2. Overview of the Jordanian Tax System  
 
    The constitution is the most important source of Jordanian tax law. Besides 
delineating the forms of the three government branches (legislative, executive, and 
judiciary) and securing the rights of its citizens, the Jordanian Constitution sets forth 
general tax principles that must be followed (Jordan Constitution, 1952). In a manner 
similar for example to the U.S. tax system, the Jordanian tax system is flexible 
(Simon, 1991). The Jordanian Constitution does not enumerate all taxes that may be 
imposed, but rather imposes general principles of taxation, thus the government has 
more freedom to enact statutory laws levying taxes. 
       The Jordanian constitution imposed limitations on the power to tax. The purpose 
of the existing limitations on taxing power is to safeguard certain guarantees of 
taxpayers such as equality and social justice. The most relevant constitutional 
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limitation on the power to tax is the legality principle. According to article 111 of the 
Jordanian Constitution, taxes may only be imposed pursuant to law. Thus, the 
government and any other entity cannot impose taxes, or increase or amend taxes, 
except by means of law. The legality principle does not permit exceptions. This 
means that even for extraordinary cases, such as the imposition of a tax for a public 
crisis, the legality principle must be respected. If not respected, the imposition of a tax 
not in accordance with the legality principle will be unconstitutional.  
       In levying taxes, the government must see to it that taxes achieve equality and 
social justice. Thus, pursuant to the Jordanian Constitution, taxes should be 
progressive in nature. In Jordan, the tax rate structure is progressive: high income 
individuals pay a greater percentage of their income to the government than do low 
income individuals (Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985 and its amendments). For 
example, the first $2000 of income might be taxed at 5 percent, while the next $4000 
income might be taxed at 10 percent. There are many arguments advanced for 
imposing progressive taxes. A detailed discussion of all such arguments is beyond the 
scope of this article; but for our purposes, it is sufficient to state that in general a 
progressive tax imposes certain efficiency costs and redistributes wealth from high-
income to low-income individuals (Livingston, 2000; Griffith, 2004; Kornhauser, 
2005). The wealthy should bear an increased tax burden because they are more 
blessed and fortunate than others. It is fairer for government to raise $3,000,000 from 
one taxpayer who earned $10,000,000 than to raise the $10,000 from a taxpayer who 
earns only $20,000. Because there are gaps in income, income redistribution would 
greatly benefit the disadvantaged, thus making the whole society better off.  
       The Jordanian Constitution also sets forth other limitations on the power to tax. 
Under the Constitution, any amount of tax levied must not exceed the ability of those 
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taxed and should not exceed the actual need of the state for funds. This principle is 
important in order to ensure the practical applicability of the tax system.  
       Other than these limitations, the Constitution does not provide any further. For 
example, the Constitution does not state any reference to the non-retroactivity 
principle whereby no tax may be imposed when the taxable event occurred prior to 
the law's taking effect. Furthermore, the Constitution does not make a reference to the 
anteriority principle whereby no tax may be levied unless it is imposed by a law that 
came into effect before the beginning of the fiscal year. The absence of this principle 
would lead to allocation by days or to complexities that result when the rules are 
changed during the year. 
       The Jordanian tax system is not totally dependent upon the Constitution, but it 
also depends upon statutory law and case law. More specifically, the Income Tax Law 
No. 57 of 1985 and its amendments is the second source of the Jordanian tax system. 
The purpose of the Income Tax Law is to dictate some general rules related to 
definitions of taxpayers and taxes, tax obligation, and tax administration.  
3. The Income Tax Law 
       Income tax plays a crucial role in Jordan because it furnishes the treasury with 
almost forty percent of its total revenues (Moore, 2004). The first income tax law on 
was promulgated in 1933. The 1933 Income Tax Law, however, applied only to 
salaries and wages. The 1933 Income Tax Law was modified in 1935 and 1936 to 
extend tax exemptions for army personnel. In 1945, the Income Tax Law expanded 
taxable items to include profits and earning of any handicraft, trade or occupation. In 
1964, Jordan issued the Income Tax Law No. 25 of 1964 which provided for 
exempted incomes, in addition to family and personal exemptions, and set up a 
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specialized court to hear tax cases. The government endorsed the Income Tax Law 
No. 34 for 1982 which provided for the first time tax returns or self-assessment 
returns. In 1985, the government decreed the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985 which 
provided further tax exemptions and incentives.  
       The Jordanian tax law provides that taxes are compulsory payments, collected for 
state and public welfare. They are to be collected from natural individuals as well as 
enterprises. The Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, in article 3, divided taxable 
incomes into two main divisions: taxable income achieved inside Jordan and taxable 
income achieved outside Jordan. After taking into consideration all allowances, such 
as education, owner-occupied housing, and dependents, accorded by the Jordanian 
legislator for the natural individual, taxable incomes are fixed according to the tax 
rates as detailed in the provisions of article 16.a of the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 
1985. Individual income taxes are assessed at four rates, 5 percent, 10 percent, 20 
percent, and 25 percent. Thus, the current tax rate structure is progressive and is 
implemented through a series of graduated rates. The Jordanian legislator -- for 
purposes of taxation -- did not distinguish between natural Jordanians and foreign 
individuals. Any income earned in Jordan whether by Jordanian or foreigner is subject 
to taxation.  
       With regard to companies, profit taxes vary between 15 percent and 35 percent 
depending on the sector concerned. For example, taxable income generated in the 
mining industry is charged at the rate of 15 percent, insurance companies is charged at 
the rate of 25 percent, and banks and financial companies is charged at the rate of 35 
percent (Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, article 16.b). When compared with taxes 
on natural individuals, the tax rate on companies is fixed as a set of percentage. For 
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tax purposes, the Jordanian legislator did not distinguish between Jordanian and 
foreign companies operating in Jordan. 
       The Jordanian legislator, in a bid to encourage investment of Jordanian funds, 
resources and savings and to avoid the transfer of same to capital markets outside 
Jordan in order to evade taxation thereon, has expanded the scope of sources of 
taxable incomes to include incomes accruing to any Jordanian or resident outside 
Jordan. Provisions of article 3.b of the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985 stipulate that 
all incomes, including interests, commissions, investment returns, profits of trading in 
currencies, valuable metals, and securities which are generated outside Jordan by any 
Jordanian or resident and that arise from his funds and deposits inside Jordan shall be 
subject to taxation. However, the Jordanian law provides for tax credit. Taxes paid by 
taxpayers in Jordan shall be reduced by the amount of tax collected from the taxpayer 
outside Jordan. This rule avoids the possibility of double-taxation. 
       The income tax is assessed annually (Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, article 
5.a). This is reasonable since for the government to be able to spend periodically, it 
must collect revenue periodically. A taxpayer has to account income, submit 
statement of accounts, account amounts of taxes to be paid, and pay them in due time. 
If a taxpayer is entitled to a tax refund, the amount of the refund will be netted with 
other tax obligations and refunded to him after receiving the application from the 
taxpayer.  
       Taxpayers must register for a tax identification number. According to article 26 
of the Income Tax Law, any taxpayer must also file a tax return with the Income Tax 
Department within four months after the end of the financial year. There are penalties 
for delay in tax payment (Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, article 36). If there is a 
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delay in paying, a monetary sum equal to 1.5 percent of the total amount is assessed. 
The presence of this penalty discourages taxpayers not to delay payment. 
       Taxpayers, and their management in the case of companies and other institutions, 
are responsible for the correct tax accounting and timely payment unless otherwise 
envisaged by legislation. Based on article 23 of the Income Tax Law, taxpayers who 
do not submit the accounting documents, or who submit documents that do not 
comply with the requirements, shall have the Income Tax Department perform its 
own accounting. Information obtained by tax inspectors during the course of a tax 
inspection may be used to collect taxes. 
       Taxpayers can appeal against activities and tax decisions of the Income Tax 
Department. Specifically, taxpayers may appeal activities of the Income Tax 
Department officers to the senior body within the Department. Taxpayers may also 
appeal, within 30 days of notification, against decisions of the Income Tax 
Department before Court of Appeals for Income Tax Cases and the Court of 
Cassation (Court of Cassation Case No. 377/93). An appeal against the activities of 
the Income Tax Department officers does not suspend further collection of taxes. 
However, the court that examines the appeal may suspend tax collection until a 
decision is made. The series of administrative and judicial reviews afford taxpayers 
due process.  
4. Tax Evasion Versus Tax Avoidance 
       When faced with numerous alternatives to reach the same desired result, 
individuals and legal entities most likely will choose the one for which they will incur 
the least income tax liability. This is known as tax planning (Habeeb, 1994). 
However, tax planning strategies encounter boundaries that are sometimes extremely 
difficult to draw. For instance, there is a gray area between tax avoidance, which is a 
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legal tax saving, and tax evasion, which is illegal. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
article, it is important to make a distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
       In general, tax avoidance can be defined as the act of taking advantage of legally 
available opportunities to minimize one's tax liability (Garner, 1999). On the other 
hand, tax evasion is defined as the willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law 
in order to illegally reduce one's tax liability. Based on this definition, tax evasion is 
illegal while tax avoidance is a legal way of saving taxes.  
       Although there is no explicit statutory provision in the Income Tax Law of 1985 
that would permit a taxpayer to do so, it is well established that a taxpayer may 
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, 
by means which the law permits. For example, the taxpayer may take advantage of a 
loophole in the law to minimize his income tax burden. Additionally, the taxpayer 
may enter into a transaction with the aim at reducing his tax burden. In any of these 
examples, the taxpayer may seem as if he abused the law and violated its purpose. 
However, the taxpayer cannot be obliged to pay more taxes as long as his activities 
are not forbidden by law. In sum, if there is no fraud or deceit, the Income Tax 
Department cannot impose tax on activities that do not correspond to any taxable 
events set forth in the tax law. 
5. Tax Evasion in Jordan 
       According to the Jordanian Income Tax Law, tax evasion involves willful actions 
or attempted actions taken by taxpayers with the aim at evading or reducing the 
payment of tax (Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, article 42). To prove tax evasion, 
the Income Tax Department must establish an act constituting an evasion or attempted 
evasion of the tax and willfulness. The language of Income Tax Law has no 
requirement of proving the amount of tax evasion. The critical issue is whether there 
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was an evasion, not the amount of tax evasion. Furthermore, the Income Tax Law 
does not require the perpetrator to actually succeed in his attempt to evade or defeat 
the tax.   
       The crime of tax evasion requires a positive action. Hence, a mere passive neglect 
of the statutory duty is insufficient to establish a violation. Acts such as submitting 
incorrect statement of accounts, making false entries or alterations, or false books or 
records, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or covering up sources 
of income constitute tax evasion (Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, article 42).  
       Willfulness is the intentional violation of a known legal duty (Najm, 2006). To 
prove willfulness, the Income Tax Department must show that the taxpayer had a 
specific intent to commit the offense. To make this showing, the Income Tax 
Department must demonstrate more than mere carelessness. There must be bad faith 
on the part of the taxpayer. Intent and bad faith are issues of facts that will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. For instance, to determine the presence of intent 
and bad faith, Court of Appeals for Income Tax Cases can take into account the 
surrounding circumstances of the case, the taxpayer's conduct, past record of 
compliance, and sophistication and level of education of the taxpayer.       
       The anti-tax evasion provisions in the Income Tax Law apply not only to the 
taxpayer himself, but also to anyone who willfully aids or assists a taxpayer in 
evading a tax. The aiding and assisting language requires two elements for conviction: 
an act of aiding and willfulness. Thus, the law attaches liability to any person who 
knowingly participates in tax evasion such as accountants, lawyers, and tax preparers.  
       Tax evasion is a misdemeanor punishable in both civil and criminal contexts. The 
Income Tax Law, in article 42, imposes a penalty double the total amount of the tax 
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evaded. This penalty is designed to compensate the treasury for any revenue forgone 
and the injury the evasion inflicted upon the state. Also, the Income Tax Law imposes 
a fine between Jordanian Dinar 100 (equivalent to US $141) and Jordanian Dinar 500 
(equivalent to US $706), or imprisonment between one week and one year. The 
Income Tax Law does not impose both fine and imprisonment on tax evaders. The 
Income Tax Law does not consider tax evasion a felony carrying a higher fine (more 
than Jordan Dinar 10,000) and longer prison term (more than three or five years).  
       It is noticeable that the Income Tax Law prescribed the same punishment for the 
tax evasion attempt as it did for the completed act. The legislative record does not 
explain why the law divided the tax offense into evasion and attempted evasion, while 
it provided the same punishment. Separate references to the attempt and the 
completed act seem unnecessary because the law prescribed the same punishment for 
the attempt as well as the completed act. The law also does not provide a possible 
penalty adjustments for repeat of felonious conduct. For example, if the taxpayer 
repeatedly falsifies books or records, the offense penalty should be increased.  
5.1 Tax Evasion in Numbers: Historical and Current Evidence 
       The Income Tax Department collects approximately Jordanian Dinar 411.4 
million in income tax, which is less than it believes it should (Central Bank of Jordan, 
2006). Over the past thirty years, there has been a gap between the income tax 
estimated by taxpayers and the income tax actually collected after adjustments made 
by the Income Tax Department staff. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the difference 
between estimated income tax and the income tax actually collected stood at 21.2 
percent; in the 1980s and 1990s the difference was 46 percent; and from 2001 to 2005 
the difference increased to 69 percent (Kettaneh, 1998; The Income Tax Department, 
2006). Similar differences have been observed at a more specific level in the banking 
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sector, a sector that falls within the highest income tax bracket of 35 percent and 
contributes over 30.54 percent to total revenues of the Income Tax Department 
(Haddad, 1999). For example, in 1996, the percentage of change between declared 
income tax by banks and adjusted tax made by the Income Tax Department was 
124.87 percent. The differences between declared and adjusted income tax at the 
banking level better sheds the light on the magnitude of the tax evasion problem in 
Jordan.    
       While the tax evasion problem is most visible in the formal economy, it is 
certainly far from negligible in the informal economy. A report estimated that the 
informal economy in Jordan was equivalent to 19.4 percent of its official GNP (The 
Economist, 2004). People in the cash economy may pay very little tax. Quantifying 
and detecting this evasion is notoriously difficult. Unlike deductions and credits that 
appear on tax returns and must be substantiated if questioned, cash transactions may 
not be reflected in any set of records. As a result, small business owners and 
household workers in Jordan have the lowest level of tax compliance.  
       The time-series statistics mentioned earlier point unambiguously to a negative 
picture. The tax gap between declared income tax and adjusted income tax is not only 
large, but has more than tripled over the past three decades and continues to grow. 
According to some estimates, the largest portion of the tax gap is due to 
underreporting of revenues and unwarranted deductions (Abu-Nassar and Uqla, 
2000). Large and well-known companies see their tax planning strategies struck down 
as devious tax evasion and are forced to pay penalties on top of the tax they had 
hoped to avoid. In sum, wherever opportunities to avoid or evade taxes present 
themselves, many Jordanian taxpayers are eager to take advantage. The gap between 
declared and adjusted income tax is sign of a serious tax compliance problem.  
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5.2 Symptoms of the Problem of Tax Evasion 
       There are two factors that provide possible explanations for income tax evasion 
by Jordanians: flaws within the current Income Tax Law; and factors external to the 
current law. Frequent changes in Income Tax Law have served to complicate the tax 
regime. Over the past years, there have been thirteen modifications made to the 
Income Tax Law including seven substantive amendments (Abu-Nassar et al., 2003). 
In addition, there are many other tax regulations, tax schedules, government 
instructions, and ministerial orders and rulings. Changes in the Income Tax Law and 
regulations make it difficult for a taxpayer to get tax return exactly right. 
       Taxpayers may not know the Income Tax Law well enough to complete their own 
tax returns and may not understand all the questions on tax returns. Lack of 
knowledge explains why taxpayers employ tax professionals. Tax professionals have 
greater technical knowledge, can maneuver through complex tax law, and maximize 
tax refunds. However, tax professionals could face a dilemma of balancing ethical tax 
behavior and client expectations of tax refunds or even evasion (Ramadan et al., 1990; 
Becker, 1996). Tax professionals operate using established accounting practices and 
general guidelines. At present, there is no code of ethics for tax professionals in 
Jordan.  
       The Income Tax Law is written in broad general language susceptible to varying 
interpretations. For example, it remains unclear whether income derived in Jordan 
shall be subject to tax even if the contract which led to this income is signed abroad. 
Corporations are subject to differentiated rates with the purpose of encouraging 
certain activities such as industry and exporting. Rate differentiation between 
corporations is difficult to administer especially when corporations are integrated and 
carry on different economic activities (Abdel-Rahman, 2001). In addition, there is a 
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plethora of tax exemptions and deductions, such as bad debts and expenses of 
previous years, which make it difficult to understand which allowable deductions a 
taxpayer can claim.  
      Article 42 of the Income Tax Law suffers several shortcomings. The provision 
proscribes that any action or attempt to evade a tax is punishable. The amount of tax 
evasion is not a necessary element of tax evasion crime. Thus, a person could defraud 
the Income Tax Department with the tax deficiency being de minimis. In this case, 
that person would be subject to penalties. The Income Tax Law should be amended so 
that not only that there be an underpayment of tax but also that such deficiency be 
substantial. Moreover, the Income Tax Law did not set forth stringent penalties for tax 
evasion. To the contrary, tax evasion in Jordan is categorized as only a misdemeanor 
and not placed in the more serious category of crimes. 
       Research studies have recognized the significance of external factors on either 
complying with tax law or not. External factors include public opinion, tax 
knowledge, justice or fairness, civic duty, and tax morale (Wenzel, 2005; Orviska and 
Hudson, 2002; Grasso and Kaplan, 1998; Torgler, 2003). These factors provide 
explanation for tax evasion in Jordan.  
       The Jordanian government requires legitimacy from its citizens. However, 
Jordanian taxpayers possess a generally negative view of their government. Taxpayers 
cannot point to any concrete improvements in their standards of living and thus see no 
reason to finance its activities absent any visible changes (The Economist, 1998; 
Solomon, 2005).  
       Favors and cronyism penetrate the current Jordanian income tax system, leaving 
citizens with little motivation to voluntarily comply with such a system. Well-
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connected businesses and individuals escape with non-payment of tax. For example, 
the government has publicly acknowledged that approximately 1500 government 
officials failed to submit their financial declarations in 2007 in a timely manner 
(Rasheed, 2007). Thus, many Jordanians notice that the more privileged taxpayers 
openly disregard the law. Several instances of violence against staff of the Income 
Tax Department have contributed to difficulties with tax collection, and prove that the 
current tax regime is unmanageable.  
       Income taxes are generally perceived as unfair and too high. Jordanian citizens 
pay more than fourth of their annual incomes in taxes and fees (Abd Al Rahim, 2001). 
An income tax is imposed on a person's earned income and thus the payment of 
income tax is seen as the loss of a vested right. The average taxpayer feels that the 
government is taking away a portion of his income, for the more money he makes, the 
more income tax he is required to pay. 
       The size of the informal economy in Jordan can be attributed to the complicated 
and expensive income taxes. Increase in income taxes encourages many entrepreneurs 
to opt out of the formal economy. The fact that this informal economy is allowed to 
escape taxation adds to the perception among citizens that the income tax system is 
problematic. 
       Tax evasion is an acute problem in Jordan because of the diversity of its 
population. Many residents in Jordan come from Palestine and Iraq. For example, in 
2003 onward, Iraqi refugees flooded Jordan. Iraqi refugees can gain permanent 
residency permits if they make large investments in Jordan. U.S. authorities worry 
that Jordan has become a money-laundering center for ill-gotten Iraqi wealth, 
potentially to the tune of billions of dollars (Solomon, 2005). The divergent Jordanian 
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population represents a tremendous challenge because they come from countries 
where the tax authorities were seen as corrupt or were nonexistent.  
5.3 Solutions for Reducing Tax Evasion 
       The problem of income tax evasion has become the subject of parliamentary 
debates and newspaper articles (Al-Rai, 2006). Initially, the government reacted to the 
problem through arbitrary assessment methods (Kettaneh, 1998). This, however, only 
made the problem worse and led to a breakdown in the relationship between the 
public and the Income Tax Department. This section of the article suggests several 
methods to reduce the problem of tax evasion. These methods involve both legal and 
non-legal techniques.  
       Procedures to amend the Income Tax Law. The Jordanian government should 
adopt stricter procedures for the amendment of Income Tax Law. Presumably, these 
procedures will prevent the frequent changes which have needlessly complicated the 
current income tax regime. 
       New tax system. The Jordanian government should put into place a new tax 
system. Among the new tax system's features are broad tax base and lower rates 
which could create a more stable economic environment. The law should impose a 
universal bookkeeping requirement instead of mandating account books in certain 
professions only such as traders. Other steps that could  prove effective in preventing 
tax evasion include comprehensive withholding requirements for property and 
business income The payment of tax owed on this type of income will not be the 
responsibility of individual taxpayers. Rather, the amount of tax due will be calculated 
by the enterprise in which the taxpayer worked and that amount will be withheld from 
the taxpayer's wages.  
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       Jordan could discontinue relying mostly on income taxes for generating revenue. 
At some point in the future, Jordan should replace its current income-tax system with 
a consumption tax such as a retail sales tax or a value added tax. A consumption tax 
system may result in a lower rate of tax evasion than under the current system. The 
taxpayer regards a tax on consumption as the loss of a mere prospect, for the taxpayer 
pays no tax until the moment he makes a consumption choice. Taxes on income, 
however, are perceived as a loss of a vested right rather than the loss of a mere 
prospect (Feldman, 2002). Taxpayers would probably perceive a broad-based 
consumption tax as more equitable than the current income-tax system. However, 
there are a host of factors Jordanian policymakers must consider as they debate the 
merits of replacing the current income-tax system with a consumption tax. These 
factors include the type of consumption tax adopted, transition from the current 
system to the new system, how high the new tax rate should be in order to achieve 
revenue neutrality, and types of special goods or services to be exempted from the 
consumption tax (Zorow and McLure, 1991). Further, adopting a consumption tax 
could involve additional administrative expenses.   
       Civil and criminal penalties. One method of tackling tax evasion is through 
penalties. The Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985 does not provide sufficient deterrence 
for evasion. Over the years, judges tended to adopt a passive approach toward tax 
evaders by imposing light sentences. Rarely jail sentences were imposed. The reason 
for this state of affair could be the fact that tax evasion is widespread. Now, judges 
should be more willing to impose jail sentences on tax evaders. Civil and criminal 
penalties should be increased and tax evasion should be upgraded from a 
misdemeanor to a felony (Al-Shawabkeh, 2003). However, adoption of stringent 
penalties may have adverse effects by increasing tax non-compliance (Borck, 2004). 
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Therefore, the government should strike the right balance regarding the correct type 
and size of remedies.    
       Tax compliance culture. The government should create tax compliance culture 
through education by creating for example pamphlets to familiarize school students 
with the notion of taxation and instill compliance. Moreover, the government can use 
newspapers, TV advertisements, and public meetings with taxpayers. The purpose of 
these activities is to develop among the general public a better understanding of the 
role of the income tax system and of the relationship between proper taxpaying and 
good citizenship. 
       Reforming the tax administration. Computerization plays an important role in the 
effort to improve service. Computers have replaced the previous filing cabinets in the 
Income Tax Department (Al-Zo'bi, 2006). Specific attention was also paid to 
redesigning the tax offices. In the past, income tax offices looked like shops rather 
than government offices. Tax officers sat together in a large open space with many 
conversations going on simultaneously and the general noise level was high. Now, tax 
offices have been redesigned whereby there is an information clerk near the entrance, 
seats are provided for waiting taxpayers, and signs are available. However, reforming 
the tax administration goes beyond new lighting, decoration, and furniture. There 
must continuous training for tax officers on how to provide rapid and courteous 
service.  
       Tax data collection and selectivity. The Income Tax Department should adopt 
scientific procedures in collecting data and selecting taxpayers for further audit. For 
example, tax assessors should audit prominent high-profile taxpayers than relatively 
small taxpayers who are not providing much revenue. This type of auditing could 
create positive impact on the compliance attitudes and practices of taxpayers' in 
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general. The Income Tax department could set up a fraud hotline to report people who 
seemed to evade their tax obligations. Additionally, tax assessors should communicate 
more with taxpayers through letters or phones. This type of communication could 
help minimize the habit of Jordanian taxpayers who just drop in the tax offices 
without appointment. 
       Public opinion of government. The negative perception of the government among 
Jordanians is not a phenomenon that can be easily changed. However, provisions 
against favoritism, improving enforcement, and further public participation in the tax 
assessment process would help restore taxpayers' faith in their government. The 
Income Tax Department, with the assistance of the Department of Statistics, could 
conduct public opinion surveys to measure taxpayers' attitudes. Public opinion of 
government could change as a result of future rise in the real income per person. 
6. Recent Developments  
       Income tax reform was included as a component of the National Agenda 
(Sawalha, 2005). In recognition of the need for reform, the Jordanian government 
submitted a new draft tax law to the parliament (Ad-dustour, 2007). However, in 
2007, following a series of hearings and political maneuvers, the parliament refused to 
approve the draft tax law, in essence sending the draft back to the beginning of the 
legislative process. 
       The draft income tax law simplifies several aspects of the tax system. The draft 
law eliminates the current plethora of exemptions. For example, the draft intends to 
unify exemptions for individuals and employees and with a maximum ceiling of 
Jordanian Dinar 10,000. As for corporate tax, the draft law does away with the current 
system, under which hotels, industries, hospitals, transport companies and contractors 
pay a 15 percent tax, and insurance, telecom, service and commercial companies pay 
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a 25 percent tax. The draft law adopts a flat rate of 20 percent for all economic and 
commercial sectors with the exclusion of banks which will remain subject to 35 
percent tax.  
       The draft law scrutinizes use of charitable organization status to avoid tax 
payment, a practice which is currently subject to exploitation. The draft law 
implements stricter standards for determining what constitutes a charitable 
organization and charitable activity. The draft tax law also creates a neutral system by 
eliminating tax incentives such as investment allowances and tax holidays (Ad-
dustour, 2007). Jordan still uses these tax incentives. However, these incentives have 
detrimental effects as a result of loss of revenues without much reward. 
       The draft law allows auditors of the Income Tax Department to examine bank 
accounts of taxpayers without the need of judicial authorization. The draft also sets 
forth stringent penalties for tax evasion which may reduce the externalities which 
hinder tax collection. Specifically, the draft law adopts non-traditional remedies to 
deal with the problem of tax evasion to include shaming provisions (Ad-dustour, 
2007). The draft law considers the crime of tax evasion a crime against honor and 
trust.    
       The draft law is likely to reduce the problem of tax evasion and improve tax 
collection in Jordan. However, several aspects of the draft may be problematic. For 
instance, the actual enactment of the draft law will probably be a lengthy process. 
Additionally, the draft law lacks transitional rules to help guide taxpayers and tax 
assessors through the changeover from the old regime to the new.  
Conclusion 
       The Income Tax Law, which has evolved over more than seven decades, is at the 
moment under serious challenge. There is an acute tax evasion problem in Jordan 
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which reduces effectiveness of the government's operations. The Income Tax law and 
its accompanied regulations and rules are complex and constantly changing. Several 
provisions in the Income Tax Law leave room for interpretation that could lead to 
abuse. Jordan's income tax level is one of highest in the Middle East. Taxpayers are 
not satisfied with the quality of the public service. 
       Jordan should establish a less complex and more internationally competitive tax 
regime. As part of the income tax reform, the Income Tax Department shall make big 
efforts to try to help taxpayers understand the laws and regulations. The tax law must 
ensure that everyone pays the fair and correct amount of tax. There should be lower 
tax rates and in certain cases such as corporations only a single tax rate. Tax evaders 
should be jailed. However, there must be the possibility of tolerance for small 
amounts of tax deficiency. At some point in the future, a consumption tax could 
substitute the current income-tax system.   
       Income tax evasion is not merely a function of opportunity and detection. The 
government can use a variety of non-legal techniques. The Income Tax Department 
must treat taxpayers as clients. The Income Tax Department has a responsibility to 
uphold the law, but it must also be seen to behave fairly, and demonstrate empathy 
with taxpayers' individual circumstances. Flexibility in individual cases and improved 
communication are essential factors in engaging taxpayer confidence and cooperation 
if the government aims to achieve effective self-assessment and exemplary voluntary 
compliance. The government should deal with tax evaders by appealing to their sense 
of patriotism and initiating public relations campaigns. In conclusion, the combination 
of carrot and stick policies may motivate taxpayers to comply voluntarily with a more 
objective and fair system of income taxation.  
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